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ABSTRACT 
This paper probes the role of banks and credit in our socio-economic system using the 
metaphor of banks as social accountants, introduced by Stiglitz and Weiss (1988). It 
highlights the credit nature of money, and thus the fact that money is an accounting construct. 
It then views credit through an accounting lens and distinguishes between bank credit  to the 
real sector (which grows  apace with the size of the economy) and banks credit to financial 
and asset markets, which by accounting necessity create a debt overhead on the real economy. 
This mechanisms is illustrated by dissection of long-term credit glows in the US economy. 
The paper considers the role of banks and regulators in facilitating the long credit boom and 
debt growth since the 1908s. It identifies three ways in which debt growth was de-emphasized 
in monitoring and policy making in OECD countries. 
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Banks As Social Accountants And Social Controllers: 
Credit and Crisis in Historical Perspective 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This paper is about the role of banks as social accountants. The topic is an important one at 
any time. But banks, bank credit and its effect on broader economic performance are now of 
particular interest because of the credit crisis which broke in 2007. This is indeed a credit 
crisis, in two senses. First, its most urgent symptom is banks’ inability to continue their social 
function of providing credit to society: there is a liquidity crisis. But underlying this symptom, 
there also is a credit cause for the crisis. This is the neglect of the basic accounting fact that 
every credit is accompanied by a debt. In that sense, the credit crisis really is a debt crisis. 
Society has neglected to ensure that credit would be directed towards self-amortizing 
investment, with real returns that would allow the paying off of debts. Instead, credit flows 
have led to the accumulation of debt, balanced for a time by rising asset values. Their plunge 
left the banking sector with a large net debt, ruined balance sheets and incapacitated to serve 
the economy well. 
 
In this paper I take a step back from current developments to place this in broad historical 
perspective. The aims are to (1) draw attention to the accounting nature of credit and money, 
(2) its implications for the function of credit in our socio-economic system, and (3) consider 
the role of banks and bank regulators in managing that function. I will find it helpful to 
employ the metaphor of banks as social accountants, introduced by Stiglitz and Weiss (1988). 
 
In a nutshell, the argument developed in this paper is the following. The basic fact 
underpinning it is that all money is credit. Money is the expression of an accounting relation 
of liability and asset, created as one agent extends credit to another, who assumes a debt. 
(Therefore the study of money and credit is au fond a study in accounting.) Such IOUs are 
monetized as they are made into tradeable instruments, typically backed by the state’s 
authority; in other words, money is ‘transferrable debt’ (Ingham, 2004; Gardiner, 2006). The 
next section briefly introduces the historical relation between credit and money, and the role 
of banks and states in developing and providing both. This is relevant beyond its historical 
interest, as money and credit today still essentially is what it was in the days of earlier 
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accounting systems such as ancient Babylonian shubati and medieval English tally sticks: the 
accounting trail of income, wealth and debt. Money historically emerged as credit, and this is 
how it still is created today in the bank lending process. Bank loans give rise to bank deposits, 
which is the form of liquidity generally accepted for all transactions of goods and services - in 
short, bank loans create the deposits that are money, and so bank credit creation is money 
creation. 
 
The second point this paper makes is that the pattern of money creation in the bank lending 
process (for instance, more to one sector and less to another) mirrors the pattern of economic 
activity. In particular, it mirrors the size of society’s investments in self-amortizing tangible 
capital formation and in financial market assets and instruments, which leave a debt overhead. 
It is in this sense that banks are ‘social accountants’. Their books are the accounting trail of 
income flows and of the creation of wealth and debt. In section 3, I delve into the accounting 
details of credit creation, setting out the relations between lending, saving, investment and 
debt, as they are mirrored in banks’ bookkeeping. This illustrates that banks truly are ‘social 
accountants’, as Stiglitz and Weiss (1988) wrote. To illustrate, in section 4 the paper follows 
that trail for the US economy over the half quarter century in the national credit flow data. 
This illustrates how the accounting nature of the money creation process matters directly to 
growth of the economy and of the debt overhead imposed on it. 
 
The third point developed in this paper is to suggest that banks may go beyond the role of 
passively recording liquidity flows. As credit is typically a bottleneck factor in economic 
growth and development, banks may be ‘controllers’ rather than only ‘accountants’. They 
may not merely facilitate, but actively shape the structure of the economy, and of its 
aberrations. But this is not uncontroversial. Section 5 therefore critically probes this assertion, 
juxtaposing it to the more common view that the moving forces in the economy are in the real 
sector and in ‘economic fundamentals’, not in the financial sector. It provides arguments and 
evidence either way, but on balance concludes that there is firm ground to view banks as 
active ‘controllers’ rather than only as passive ’accountants’ of the economy. 
 
Fourth, this is not to be reduced to simplistically blaming (or crediting) the banking system 
for the (im)balance in society’s income, wealth and debt growth. For it throws up the question 
of ‘who controls the controller?’, bringing into focus the role of monetary and financial 
authorities in setting the accounting rules for banks. In section 6 I identify three development 
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that have contributed, since the mid-1980s, both to redirect bank lending from real-sector 
investments towards financial investments - so increasing debt levels and endangering 
sustainability - and to make this sea change less than obvious to the public at large, to 
economic commentators and even to regulators. 
 
This paper, in brief, is about accounting, organizations and society - the accounting rules that 
underlie money creation, credit extension and debt buildup; the institutionalization of this 
process in banking organizations; and the society’s delagetion of oversight and control to the 
financial and monetary authorities. 
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2. All Money is Credit…  
In this section we consider the first plank in the above account: the proposition that all money 
is credit, an assertion that underpins all that follows. This proposition goes against a widely 
held belief, based on textbook economics, that money historically emerged as a convenient 
unit of account to replace the cruder barter trade; and that the use of credit and debt was an 
optional extra, predicated on the prior existence of money and conceptually quite separate 
from it. This convenient pedagogical narrative has been taught since times immemorial – at 
least since Aristotle, as Ingham (2004) recounts - but if assessed as actual financial history, it 
is found to be devoid of historical or ethnographic evidence to support it. There are reasons 
(some of them reviewed by Wray, 1998) why it is nonetheless a popular and persistent fable, 
but these are beyond the scope of the present paper. 
 
Instead we consider recent evidence from the ‘archeology of money’ (which comprises 
research in archeology, anthropology and numismatics) in favour of the credit origin of 
money – see e.g. Wray (1998, 2004), Ingham (2004), and Hudson (2002), building on early 
seminal contributions by Knapp ([1905] 1924) and Mitchell Innes (1913, 1914). A major 
argument for this position is logical. It is that specialization of labour - which characterized 
societies as early as the Mesolithic age – must have implied credit relations.  Specialization of 
labour and the attendant exchange of goods (e.g. between hunters, toolmakers and gatherers) 
requires a social mechanism to bridge the time between delivery of the various goods. A 
hunter needs bow and arrow from the toolmaker before he can hunt and deliver meat in return. 
In the meantime, the hunter is a debtor as he owes the toolmaker, who is a creditor. In 
societies also involving farmers, bakers, and so on, the web of debtor-creditor relations 
quickly becomes complex. Such relations would therefore have been recorded in some way. 
This is not just another pedagogical narrative. For instance, archeologists have found notched 
bones from Stone Age hunter-gatherer societies, where the notches have been interpreted by 
scholars as evidence of quite elaborate accounting systems (Gardiner, 2004). 
 
The highly developed ancient civilizations likewise had credit-money, typically linked to the 
temple-state administration system. In ancient Egypt, (to be completed…) From the temple 
ruins of the ancient Babylonian and Sumerian civilisations (from 2,000 to 3,000 BC) have 
been recovered thousands of clay tablets  (called shubati, meaning ’received’) which are 
receipts for grain deliveries to the temple (in payment of taxes to the temple-state elite), 
recording the sender’s and receiver’s names, the quantity, and the date. In striking analogy to 
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modern double-entry accounting methods, many of these tablets were sealed in cases 
inscribed with the same information. These tax receipts are the oldest IOUs we know of, and 
like bills of exchange used in later times, these cases and their contents were ‘signed and 
sealed documents and passed from hand to hand’ (Innes, 1914:35). When the debt described 
on the case was cleared, it was broken. Archeologists have recovered many such cases intact, 
indicating that, just like the outstanding stock of money in our economic system, their primary 
use had become to facilitate transactions, not to settle debt. They were tradable and functioned 
as means of payment, their value determined by the authority of the temple-state ruling elite. 
In short, these IOUs were money, long before coins were introduced to Babylonia and Persia 
by Alexander the Great in 331 BC, when he minted temple gold into coins to pay his army. In 
ancient Egypt and Babylonia credit preceded token money, and coins and notes are tokens of 
credit relations. 
 
So it was in Europe, where since the earliest times formalized and recorded creditor-debtor 
relations were used as money, i.e. to settle transactions of goods and services. In many 
Western European societies, the form this took was the square wooden stock with notches, 
known as a tally (Wray 1998:41). It was created when a buyer became a debtor to seller. Both 
their names, with the date, were written on opposite sides of the stick. Then the stock was 
split down the middle but stopped about an inch from the base. There thus were two smaller 
sticks with a equal amount of notches, one (called the ‘stock’ and retained by the creditor) 
longer than the other (the ‘stub’, held by the debtor). Stock and stub could always by matched 
to ensure they has not been tampered with, and to ascertain the debt to be paid. Again, it is 
obvious that tallies, like Sumerian shubatis, were a form of double-entry bookkeeping. And 
like shubatis, wooden tally sticks were not primarily used to settle bi-personal debts but 
circulated as means of payment. Innes (1913) recounts how well known mediaeval fairs such 
as St. Glies in Winchester or Champagne and Brie in France were primarily clearing houses, 
were merchants came to clear there tally stocks and stubs. As wooden tallies are not preserved 
as well as clay shubati’s we do not know for how long wooden tallies have been used as 
money. Bu tallies in one form or another were widespread through ancient Europe. Copper 
pieces purposely broken like jigsaw puzzle pieces in analogy to stock and stub have been 
found in Italy, dating from between 1000 and 2000 BC. 
 
In summary, credit cannot have evolved from money, as textbook allegory has it. The actual 
process was the other way round. The evidence is that historically, tax debts and trade debts 
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were monetized – that is, debt tokens such as tally sticks became transferrable and circulated 
as medium of payment. Credit historically preceded money, and money has been and still is a 
category of credit. In our society, banks have replaced the Babylonian temples and medieval 
European merchant and feudal lords of earlier times as the institutions authorized to issue 
money. But they still essentially do what was always done. They create new credit tokens 
(now electronic bits) that are transferable and widely accepted as means of payment. 
 
This also implies that it is not the case that banks lend out pre-existing money at some 
multiple when they make a loan. Rather, it is the other way round: banks create money as they 
lend. This reality is ancient, as we have just seen, but also modern. Money, most commonly 
defined in terms of bank deposits or ‘liquid liabilities’ is created as banks grant loans. Each 
act of bank lending so increases the money stock. As the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago 
explains: ‘The actual process of money creation takes place primarily in banks.” …  "What 
they do when they make loans is to accept promissory notes in exchange for credits to the 
borrowers' transaction accounts. Loans (assets) and deposits (liabilities) both rise by the 
amount of the loan” (FRBC, 1992:3,6). The Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas on its educational 
website simply states that ‘[b]anks actually create money when they lend it’ (FRBD, 2009). 
This continuing reality of money emanating from the credit creation process is also borne out 
by modern econometric research. Caporale and Howells (2001) show for UK data that loans 
precede and ‘cause’ deposits, in the sense of statistical causality tests in the context of a 
Vector Auto Regression framework. Banks first make loans, which give rise to the bank 
deposits that are generally accepted as ‘money’. 
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3. … But Not All Credit Is Money 
 
The historical credit nature of money, and the key role that banks play in its creation, make it 
clear why a credit crisis is a liquidity crisis. If banks are unable to create credit due to ruined 
balance sheets, this chokes off the supply of modern-day ‘tally sticks’ to the real economy, 
and hampers the transactions in goods and services. But this does not explain the role of debt. 
Again, the historical analogy of tallies may be helpful here. If each tally stick were created in 
a transaction of actual goods or services, to the amount of the price of that transaction, each 
debt would be matched by a credit, and there would not be net debt in the economy. But 
where tally sticks are ‘monetized’ - that is: circulate without direct link to a specific 
transaction between two parties - it is possibly to create credit tokens without transactions and 
thus without the necessity of first having produced goods and services. Debt and credit have 
now been created without counterparts in the real economy in terms of goods and services. If 
such tokens are also traded at interest (so that new means of payment have to be created to 
cover the interest), the growth of debt may take on its own dynamic, functionally separate 
from transactions of goods and services in the real economy. The burden of debt servicing 
may then easily grow out of proportion with the economy’s ability to pay. This was indeed the 
case in ancient societies which used monetized trade and tax debts as means of payments. 
These economies therefore typically had in place mechanisms to clear the debt overhead, such 
as periodical ‘clean slate’ or ‘jubilee’ debt cancellations in the ancient Babylonian and 
Israelite societies, respectively ( for details, see Hudson 2002).  
 
Again, what was true in ancient societies is still true in ours. While all money is credit, credit 
is not all money. In our economy, most newly created ‘tally sticks’ (that is, bank loans) are 
not used in payments for goods and services. Only a minority share of bank lending is devoted 
to creating bank deposits in support of investment and consumption. Such deposits then 
circulate and are generally accepted means of payment for goods and services: they are 
money. But most lending is, in contrast, in support of financial investment, that is: the 
creation of, and trade in, financial assets and instruments. Most liquidity available in the 
world today is used in financial markets, not in transactions of goods and services. The 
balance between the two has sharply changed since the mid-1980s, as we will explore below 
in section 4 for the case of the US. Such financial assets and instruments are not generally 
accepted means of payment, and the bank credit creation that supports them is therefore not 
part of the money creation process in support of the real economy. It bears repetition: all 
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money is bank credit, but not all bank credit is money. The difference matters directly to our 
understanding of how banks have performed in their role of ‘social accountants’. 
 
Let us therefore retrace this argument in detail in the setting of contemporary bank credit 
creation. This will clarify the link between the accounting nature of bank money creation and 
he development of a credit crisis (symptomatic of a debt crisis). The argument starts from a 
simple principle, familiar to any fledgling student of accounting. In bank lending, as in any 
area where double entry bookkeeping is used, assets must equal liabilities. Each act of bank 
lending creates a liability to some customer (a debt payable to the bank) and the 
accompanying asset (the bank deposit, which is money). But the way in which credit is used 
determines whether there will be a net debt left. If the loan is used for a self-amortizing 
investment (e.g. in fixed capital formation), this creates value-added in the form of products 
and services, and allows the debt to be paid off. If, on the contrary, the loan is ‘invested’ in 
the financial markets, this will push up the price of financial assets and creates asset wealth 
for the owners. The assets may be traded many times by ‘investors’ who each have taken out 
a loan to finance the purchase, and each time the asset may increase in value – but total debt 
grows in parallel. It can only be repaid by withdrawing from the financial markets the 
liquidity equal to that created by the total of the loans. This settles the debt, but also deflates 
the price of the financial assets to their original value. 
 
This brief narrative in essence is the story of an asset boom followed by a debt deflation. The 
two uses of credit broadly reflect real-sector investment typical of commercial banking and 
financial investment as done by, for instance, merchant banks and securities traders. The 
important point is that in terms of liquidity growth, financial investment by itself is a zero-
sum game. Financial markets can only grow sustainably by absorbing liquidity created in the 
real sector, which is based on self-amortizing loans. Alternatively, they can grow 
unsustainably by simultaneously diverting liquidity from the real sector and increasing 
indebtedness. This is unsustainable as it must, with axiomatic certainty, at some point end. 
Still, such (ultimately) unsustainable debt growth may be sustained over decades by 
expanding the stock of financial assets and instruments.  
 
From the above it is clear that the growth of debt depends on the use of newly created credit-
money – whether in support of self-amortizing tangible investment, or in debt-bearing 
financial market investment. This may not be so obvious on the microeconomic level since in 
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an asset price boom any single individual can borrow, purchase assets, and sell them to pay 
off the debt with a profit left. No personal debt remains, and the good news spreads. However, 
as in many areas of economics there is a micro-macro paradox, or a ‘fallacy of composition’. 
For on the macro, society-wide level, there must be a growth in indebtedness of the economy 
when assets are traded at rising prices. This indebtedness takes the form of both rising 
commitments for the real sector to finance asset transaction out of wages and profit, and rising 
actual debt levels. When the asset was sold at a profit, someone else bought the asset at the 
new, higher price. He or she financed this either by diverting liquidity away from real-sector 
transactions, or by borrowing – at higher levels than did the first buyer. Therefore asset price 
booms are accompanied by rising debt and by a slowdown in real-sector nominal growth.  
 
This exploration of the growth in assets and liabilities following the accounting act of credit 
creation also has implications for what is probably the most widely know accounting equality 
in macroeconomics. This is the “I = S” equality, stating that savings S equal investment I. 
‘Savings’ is a residue concept defined as the difference between income and consumption, 
and often measured by total deposits. So in light of the above, an act of bank lending creates 
the savings (deposits) necessary to finance an investment (with the loan): “I = S” holds. 
During an asset boom most such ‘investments’ do not create tangible capital that generates a 
future income flow to pay off the debt. They are the creation of financial assets and 
instrument representing claims on others’ income – that is, they create debt. High rates of 
gross savings are so accompanied by high rates of debt growth. It is still the case that I = S 
holds – it most do, because it is an axiomatic accounting equality, not an empirical regularity. 
But total savings equal total investments, not just fixed capital formation. Real-sector 
investment (which we will denote IR) and financial investments (denoted IF) make up total 
investment (denoted I) so that I = IR + IF = S. With IF being vastly greater than IR and debt 
growth equal to IF, it is obvious that a society can grow into debt by directing its bank credit 
flows, and thereby its savings, away from tangible capital formation and towards financial 
market investment. This trend will be readily apparent from inspecting society’s accounting 
ledger: the record of bank credit flows. To this we turn in the next section. 
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4. Searching the Books: An Audit of US Credit Flows, 1952-2007 
 
In this section we apply the approach developed above to recent trends in today’s largest 
economy, that of the US. The aim is to illustrate that credit to the real and to the financial 
sector correspond to growth of the real economy and to debt buildup, respectively. US trends 
have been indicative of those in most of the industrialized countries.  Their banking sectors, in 
the long credit boom that preceded the crisis, had been directing its lending so as to profit 
from asset price gains, rather than supporting investment in real-sector development, 
especially since the early 1980s. The growth in debt that accompanied the 1980s-1990s boom 
in asset markets was manageable as long as asset prices kept rising. Starting from a low level 
of indebtedness, this dynamic was sustained for about a quarter century, and played a 
particularly large role in growth and development of the Anglo-Saxon economies. Its end 
came with the summer 2006 turnaround on the US housing market, the US banking crisis this 
caused throughout 2007, and the financial contagion to other banking sector and then to entire 
economies throughout 2008, which is still continuing at the moment of writing.  
 
In order to operationalize the distinctions developed above, consider that money is whatever 
is generally acceptable in payment for goods and services (which together make up the ‘real’ 
sector). Statistically, the total value of those payments for final goods and services is 
measured by the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). At the same time, as was shown above, 
money is bank deposits arising from bank credit creation. Therefore any increase in GDP 
must be mirrored in bank credit creation supporting transactions of final goods and services 
(plus interfirm trade credit). This is an accounting equality implied in the fact that money is 
credit. A first illustration of the money-is-credit approach is therefore to demonstrate that 
growth in bank credit to the real sector (plus any increase in its trade credit) equals growth in 
the value of GDP. This extends the approach first developed by Werner (1992;1997;2005) 
and applied to the Japanese economy. 
 In order to probe this, we must split US debt into credit to the real sector and credit to 
the financial sector, also called the ‘FIRE’ (Finance, Insurance and Real Estate) sector. The 
data are provided in the US ledger book – its ‘flow of funds’ accounting (FOFA) framework, 
in which table Z.1 reports the flow of funds for different debt instruments, for different sectors 
(Federal Reserve 2009). In the debt definition used in FOFA table D1, growth of total debt in 
the US domestic real economy is equal to growth in the value of all credit and equity market 
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instruments held as liability by the US domestic nonfinancial sector – that is, its domestic 
firms, households and local, state and federal government. This includes consumer credit, 
business credit, mortgage credit, government credit, equity, and finance credit market 
instruments (but it excludes employee retirement funds credit).  In mapping debt growth onto 
economic growth (in GDP), we note that the FOFA total-debt definition is both too wide (it 
includes FIRE sector debt) and too narrow (it excludes trade credit). Therefore in order to 
arrive at credit to the real sector (i.e. in support of GDP), we subtract from the total value of 
credit market instruments all equity, mortgage and finance credit market instruments which 
support FIRE sector transactions, not transactions in goods and services. We also correct for 
inter-firm trade credit (account FL383170005 in table Z.1), which is debt creation in support 
of transactions in goods and services, but not via credit market instruments and therefore not 
recorded in the FOFA definition of total debt. Trade credit is substantial: the stock of 
outstanding trade debt equals a quarter of GDP (24.4 % in 2007Q4), up from 12 % at the start 
of the series we study in 1952Q1. This is just one illustration of the importance of studying 
the whole credit supply, not just an (arbitrary) statistical definition of ‘money’. 
 
The other part of the US debt is FIRE-sector debt: principally equity, insurance and mortgage 
credit. In terms of sectors, this includes both interbank credit and credit to nonbank financial 
institutions such as savings institutions, credit unions, funding corporations, property-casualty 
and life insurance companies, mortgage pools, closed-end funds, exchange traded finds, 
private pension funds, money market mutual funds, real estate investment trusts, and security 
brokers and dealer. In term of instruments, US domestic FIRE-sector debt is mainly (for about 
95 %) bank debt, i.e. credit market instruments; but it also includes other instruments such as 
equities, bonds and currency. 
 
Growth of credit to the US real sector and the US FIRE-sector since 1952 relative to growth 
of US GDP are shown below in tables 1 and 2 in terms of stocks and flows, respectively. The 
graphs clearly show that total debt growth trends are equal to financial-sector debt growth, as 
in the conceptual account developed in section 3. Financial-sector debt growth was double-
digit growth in most years, leading to an expansion of the financial sector from being equal to 
the size of the real economy in 1952 to a volume of nearly five times GDP in 2007. In 
contrast, growth in real-sector credit closely tracked growth in the value of all transactions of 
goods and services as measured by GDP -  again, just as was suggested above on the basis of 
the money-is-credit approach. Over the long term, credit to the real sector grows almost 
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exactly in parity to GDP: over the 1952-2008 period, the ratio of the stock of real-sector credit 
to GDP has a mean of 1.01 and varies between 0.83 and 1.11. Until the 1980s, real-sector 
credit growth rates also closely track the ups and down of GDP growth. Afterwards, during 
the financial liberalization era, the link becomes looser in the short term, but the quantity 
correspondence (in nominal US Dollars) in the long term is preserved. 
 
The graphs confirm that real-sector credit is used in support of self-amortizing production and 
consumption of goods and services, leaving no net debt growth beyond the nominal growth 
rate of the economy. FIRE-sector bank credit creation bears no link to real economic growth 
patterns at al during the financial liberalization era. It pushed up asset prices and left an 
increasing debt burden to the real economy. US households’ financial obligations – 
principally, debt servicing and financial fees - rose by a quarter between 1980 and 2007, from 
16 % to 20 % of household disposable income (Federal Reserve 2009). As is well 
documented elsewhere, the era of high debt growth from the 1980s to the end of the boom in 
2006-2007 was indeed also a time of low to negative household savings levels, falling real-
sector investments (ref) and skyrocketing asset prices (ref).  
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Table 1 
US debt 1952-2007 (stocks, % GDP)
source: FOFA
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Table 2 
growth in US debt and in GDP, 1953-2007  (flows, % GDP)
source: FOFA
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5. Banks: Accountants Or Also Controllers? 
 
We now move from description of an asset-cum-debt boom to its possible causes. As noted, 
almost all FIRE sector debt originated as credit market instruments, which is bank credit 
creation. The above exploration of the centrality of bank credit creation also suggests that an 
analysis of the impact of credit on the economy should center on the role of banks and on 
those regulating the banks. There is however one powerful objection to this. In the metaphor 
of banks as social accountants (Stiglitz and Weiss 1988) , banks are passive recorders of the 
financial implications of society’s choices and preferences. Even if it is recognized that the 
economy can grow out of kilter due to bank-created debt, with too much debt relative to the 
capacity of the real-sector to add value and pay off the debt, it might be argued that banks 
have little to do with this. Bank practices are the proximate, but not the ultimate cause of a 
credit boom and credit crisis. Juxtaposed to this view may be an alternative metaphor of banks 
not as accountants, but as controllers – as not only recording, but also actively managing and 
advising society’s financial course. In this section we contrast these two views and reflect on 
the evidence for both. 
 
Bank may be viewed - as indeed they are in most monetary analyses - as passive 
accommodators of whatever it is that (real-sector) economic agents want to have financed. 
The idea that generous credit might be an independent causal factor stimulating growth (but in 
an unsustainable manner) has recently been very far from regulators’ minds; and so was the 
very possibility that financial collapse might have real economic impacts. Some even felt 
compelled to retract their earlier views on a more active role for banks in supporting growth 
and precipitating crisis. Ben Bernanke for instance, the current Chairman of the Federal 
Reserve, in a former life was an academic researching the role of credit in the macroeconomy. 
One of his better known studies in his early academic career was on the Great Depression, and 
the role of bank leverage and credit aggregates in bringing it about. Already then it was ‘only 
the older writers who seemed to take the disruptive impact of the financial breakdown for 
granted’ (Bernanke 1983:258). By 1983 to suggest this had become innovative and 
controversial. Bernanke did so, asking ‘did the financial collapse of the early 1930’s have real 
effects on the macroeconomy?’. He studied the behaviour of credit aggregates and cautiously 
answered his own question  with the observation that ‘[t]he evidence at least is not 
inconsistent with this hypothesis’(1983:275). But even this carefully phrased double negative 
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had become a bridge too far another twelve years later, when financial liberalization was in 
full swing and Bernanke had risen to a position of prominence in the economics profession. In 
a paper with Mark Gertler in the authorative Journal of Economic Perspectives, he deplored 
his earlier work and wrote it was ‘inappropriate’ for ‘some authors to focus on the behavior of 
credit aggregates’ since ‘…examining the dynamic responses of various credit aggregates 
is…largely uninformative…’.  He added in a note, referring to his (1983) studied, 
‘[n]otwithstanding the fact that, in a previous life, Bernanke has performed similar exercises. 
Mea culpa.’(Bernanke and Gertler 1995:44). The only mechanism, in the mainstream 
literature, through which credit van affect growth is via the so-called ‘credit channel’ of 
monetary transmission, a strand of literature of which Bernanke was one of the founding 
fathers. This literature explores whether “imperfect information and other "frictions" in credit 
markets might help explain the potency of monetary policy” ((Bernanke and Gertler 1995:44) 
– no independent effect of credit flows on the real economy is presumed. Indeed, in 
describing it, Bernanke advises that it is unwise to “think of the credit channel as a distinct, 
free-standing alternative to the traditional monetary transmission mechanism, but rather as a 
set of factors that amplify and propagate conventional interest rate effects.” (Bernanke and 
Gertler 1995:44). 
 
 
In the conventional view, then, there is no model for a robust and lasting impact of credit 
conditions themselves on economic growth. It is relatively uncontroversial that an occasional 
credit crunch can temporarily restrain growth in some sectors. An alternative view is based on 
the logical corollary to this generalized to the entire economy. This is that generous credit 
conditions (such as reigned over the last quarter century) can accelerate growth, with some 
sectors typically being stimulated more than others. In this sense, banks can be viewed a 
‘driving force’, as in Bernanke’s repudiated early views. But it is not implied that the growth 
regime so instigated is sustainable, even though it can be kept going for decades. The theory 
underpinning this would refer to conceptualisations of capitalist societies as ‘financial 
capitalism’, where financial markets are accorded a dynamic independent of real-sector 
developments. Because of this independence, there is theoretical scope also for financial 
markets as ultimate, not just proximate causal factors in shaping the business cycle – so that 
there is also a ’credit cycle’. Such theories, while not part of standard textbook lore, have a 
long pedigree stretching from Thornton (1802), Sismondi (1815), List (1842), Tooke (1844), 
Roscher (1877) and Marx (1884) to Keynes (1930), Schumpeter (1954) and  Minsky (1978) 
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and on to contemporary writers including Werner (1992), Hudson (1992), Gardiner (1998), 
Wray (1998), Borio and Lowe (2004), Roubini (2008) and Geanakoplos (2009). 
 
Many of these approaches counterpose the interests of asset owners (rentiers) to those of 
wage earners and real-sector entrepreneurs. Some interpret financial market developments, 
including interest policies and (de-)regulation preferences, as the outcome of class struggles 
between social strata (as in Ingham, 2004).  All view the windfall gains that asset price booms 
bring to rentiers – the ‘unearned increment’ as JS Mill famously called it – with a critical eye. 
It diverts purchasing power from industry and wages, creates a debt burden on the economy 
(Hudson 1992), and may lead to resource misallocation (Geanakoplos 2009). Keynes, for 
instance, expressed a longing for the ‘euthanasia of the rentier’ as part of his envisaged 
solution to imbalanced monetary and financial policies. Alternatively, financial market 
developments in this tradition are interpreted as arising endogenously from changing risk-and-
return preferences of investors over the course of the business cycle. The seminal articulation 
of this is Hyman Minsky’s analysis of financial market dynamics, which cause instability to 
be built into capitalist economic systems. In complete contrast to the mainstream view, credit 
aggregates and leverage play a central role in these analyses. Geanakoplos (2009:9) called for 
an end to ‘the obsession with interest rates’ and asserted that ‘regulating leverage, not interest, 
are the solution for a troubled economy’. 
 
Quite apart from the theoretical view underlying it, there is quantitative research to support an 
interpretation of leverage and bank credit creation as causal force in the business cycle. 
Caporale and Howells (2001) analyse the interactions between bank loans, bank deposits and 
total transactions in the economy (both in the real economy and in the financial sector). They 
conclude that “ loans cause deposits and that those deposits caused an expansion of 
wealth/GDP/transactions” (Caporale and Howells, 2001:555). Causality runs from bank 
lending to bank deposit creation and on to economic expansion, reflected in the total of real-
sector transactions and financial-sector (wealth) transactions. Werner (2005:224) 
disaggregated bank credit flows in Japan from 1980 to 2000 and runs a number of tests on 
causality, concluding that “causality runs from credit to nominal GDP and not inversely”. 
So the evidence, as they say, is mixed. Most monetary researchers currently adhere to a view 
of banks as accountants and bank credit creation as a passive reflection of economic 
fundamentals, at best allowing for temporary balance sheet effects which are superficial to the 
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economic system. As Malcolm Knight, General Manager of the Bank for International 
Settlements put it in a 2006 speech “The prevailing mainstream theoretical paradigms, 
enshrined in current textbooks and research, find it difficult to accommodate a significant role 
for quantitative aggregates over and above that played by interest rates”. In the current crisis 
turning into a genuine depression that threatens to engulf that economic system, this may read 
as a view seriously out of touch with reality. But in fairness, it should be noted that present 
conditions can quite consistently be, and have indeed been, interpreted as one of those rare 
events that are bound to happen once in a lifetime. Such events do not undermine the validity 
of theories describing the normal situation – that is, of the New Monetary Consensus and of 
its subcategory the Credit View. 
 
Alternatively, there is theory and evidence to support the view that banks are not only 
accountants, but also controllers; and bank credit creation not only reflects, but is also a causal 
factor in the pattern of economic growth and recession. Whether or not the 2007-8 credit 
crisis and the 2009 - ? recession will turn this minority view into conventional wisdom 
remains to be seen and this paper leaves readers to make up their own minds on the issue. 
Meanwhile, proponents of either view are agreed on the accounting role of banks, and on the 
fact that over the last few decades banks have failed in their role of prudent accountants. 
Banks have, apparently, not timely and effectively signaled financial aberrations that were 
building up to those who were in a position to curb them. This is not necessarily to put undue 
blame for the crisis on the banking sector – the problem may be with banks or with heir 
regulators (or with both). We now turn to an examination of the possible causes for this 
failure. 
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6. Asset Booms, Debt Buildup and Society’s Accounting Rules 
 
In order to provide true social accounts, banks’ books should keep track both of society’s 
income stream and of its wealth and debt. It was demonstrated in section 3 that the imbalance 
between, on the on hand, income and wealth and, on the other, its debt, is what constitutes the 
nub of a financial crisis; and that the genesis of this imbalance is in the bank credit creation 
process and in the use of bank credit flows (which may or may not mirror economic 
fundamentals outside of the banking sector). Whether or not such imbalance is monitored and 
acted upon depends importantly society’s accounting rules in this area  - on the ways in which 
income, wealth and debt are recorded by banks and by national and international statistical 
institutions, and signaled to financial regulators. If the rules do not ensure close monitoring 
and correct interpretation, this may be one reason for growing imbalances without alarm bells 
going off1. In this section we discuss three features of society’s accounting rules, and the way 
they are used or ignored, which have made banks’ role of prudent accountants more difficult - 
in particular, which have obscured the development of debt alongside wealth. These features 
are: 
(i) The treatment of financial investments (IF introduced in section 3) in the System of 
National Accounts, 
(ii) financial market deregulation, exemplified by the 1999 repeal in the US of the 
1933 Glass Steagall act, and 
(iii) Monetary authorities’ conviction that asset pricess and wealth should play a small 
role or no role in monetary policy. 
 
6.1 Financial investments in the System of National Accounts 
 
The important point, in the present context, about the System of National Accounts that all 
countries adhere to when drawing up there national accounting statements, is that most of the 
returns from financial investment are not recorded as income. Therefore official income (GDP) 
represents only a part of actual spendable income. Especially during an asset boom, official 
                                                 
1
 Or if they do go off, to ignore or ‘fix’ them, as the Icelandic authorities did in 2006. The Chairman of the 
Central Bank’s Board of Governors at the bank's Annual Meeting on March 31, 2006, declared that “[i]n an age 
of technology and computers we sometimes experience malfunctions in the warning bells themselves and fixing 
them is all that needs to be done.  That may be the case with some of those which have sounded recently” 
(Tomasson 2008). 
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statistics so obscure the extent to which a nation’s consumption has become dependent on 
income from asset wealth, and is proportionally vulnerable to an asset price plunge. 
 
It is obvious that financial transactions themselves -  which are wealth transactions – do not 
fall under an income definition, such as the Gross Domestic Product. GDP is “…equal to final 
consumption expenditure plus gross capital formation plus exports minus imports (UN et al, 
2008, par. 2.222)”, according to the System of National Accounts, the authorative prescription 
for GDP calculations published jointly by the United Nations, the Commission of the 
European Communities, the International Monetary Fund, the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development, and the World Bank. Financial transactions are clearly not part of 
consumption, government spending, imports or exports. 
 
But what about the income from financial investment? The question may be raised if not the 
returns on those investment are part of income. The answer is that for the larger part, they are 
not. Firms undertaking financial investments take their returns mostly as capital gains (or 
‘holding gains’) that is, from increases in the value of their financial assets. These are not 
profits which are included in GDP - although these firms do make profit, as a typically minor 
part of their total returns. A confusion may arise because ‘taxes on capital gains are treated as 
taxes on income’(UN 1993), and as such are included as a sub category within System of 
National Accounts entry D51. But specialists have emphasized time and again that holding 
gains, while taxed as income ‘… are not included in the SNA definition of income’ (UN, 
1993). Again, another confusion may arise by considering holdings gains as part of property 
income. But the System of National Accounts ‘…draws a distinction between property income 
and holding gains and losses. The latter are changes in value of an asset due to changes in its 
price that constitute neither transactions nor income’ (Schreyer and Stauffer, 2004). ‘[T]he 
SNA definition of income excludes holding gains’ (Lequiller, 2004). ‘In the SNA, … holding 
gains and losses are neither the result of production nor income…’ (Nordin, 2005). Instead, 
holding gains are included in the item ‘change in real national net worth’, defined as ‘…[t]he 
sum of changes in net worth of all resident institutional sectors less the neutral holding 
gains/losses (that is, in proportion to the general price level)….’ (UN, 2003). They are part of 
wealth, not income. 
  
In considering how the returns of the financial industry are to be represented in the System of 
National Accounts, Schreyer and Stauffer (2004) explicitly recognize that the most important 
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element of these returns, viz. capital gains, are not included in the income of the financial 
industry (and thus excluded from GDP); and note that this exclusion is odd. It is helpful to 
quote Schreyer and Stauffer (2004) at some length: 
 
‘…It would thus appear that holding gains or losses cannot enter the valuation of financial services. 
Such a categorical exclusion sits, however, uneasily with economic theory and with the perception of 
practitioners in the financial services industry. If one admits that all assets and liabilities on the 
balance sheet contribute to and are potential carriers of implicitly-priced financial services and if there 
is a presumption that the value of these services during a period is somehow related to the financial 
return on assets and liabilities during the same period, then it seems difficult to exclude all price 
changes from measures of financial return, and to limit the latter to interest and dividend payments, i.e. 
to property income as conventionally defined in the SNA. The difficulty of excluding price changes 
from measures of financial return lies in the simple fact that economic actors look at all components of 
remuneration of financial assets and (expected) price changes are an important component. For certain 
instruments, in particular shares, they are the most important element and their exclusion would render 
measures of financial return void of content.’ 
 
The issue was deemed of sufficient importance to form a dedicated ‘OECD Task Force on 
Financial Services’ to consider it. In 2005 this Task Force reported that ’[b]ecause of the 
conceptual and practical difficulties in estimating expected holding gains and losses, the Task 
Force agreed to presently not recommend the inclusion of expected holding gains and losses 
in the measurement of financial services output. Still it is recommended that further 
investigation of the role of expected holding gains and losses throughout the system be made.’ 
(Nordin, 2005). The task force met for the last time in May 2005, in Paris. Holding gains are 
thus not part of the financial services industry output and therefore are not include in its 
income. 
 
In sum, neither financial investments not the greater part of the incomes from the returns on 
those investments (namely, holding gains) are part of GDP. It is not suggested here that the 
System of National Accounts should be changed to make GDP include capital gains. This 
would run into insurmountable conceptual problems. But, like Schreyer and Stauffer (2004) 
quoted above, it should be noted note that in a substantial sense it is odd that large incomes 
are excluded from the most widely used income definition. Especially during an asset price 
boom, the discrepancy will be large. This in turn obscures what the actual effects o the asset 
price boom, and of a possible collapse in asset prices, would be on incomes, and via knock-on 
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effects also on those real economy firms depending on those incomes for part of its demand. 
Income depending on debt creation is off society’s income balance sheet. Actual incomes are 
therefore more vulnerable to debt deflation than GDP income development, the standard 
yardstick for economic performance, would suggest. This leads to an underrating of the 
macroeconomic income effects of debt deflations. When assessing the rate and sustainability 
of income growth, policymakers should inspect both society’s income and its wealth balance 
sheets. 
 
6.2 financial market deregulation 
 
A similar problem arises with respect to society’s accounting rules for the key sector of 
banking. Such rules provide a legal answer to the question ‘What can banking companies do?’, 
as Barth et al (2000) observe. In particular, the question is how extensive banks can mix real-
sector and FIRE sector investments – or, in other words, whether commercial banks can 
engage in merchant banking an the marketing of securities and insurance products; and what 
their reporting and disclosure requirements are. Advocates of regulation point to systemic 
risks that accompany private profitability and the limited scope for effective monitoring that 
deregulation brings.  If accounting rules allow banks to move part of their investments and 
revenues off balance sheet, then a balanced assessment by bank regulators of their 
profitability and risk exposure will be impaired. 
 
In contrast, regulation has often been argued to be costing too much in terms of financial 
innovation, efficiency and risk diversification. This view, which has been held by monetary 
policy makers since the 1980s until very recently, ties in with their position discussed in 
section 5 that the moving forces in the economy are in the real sector and in ‘economic 
fundamentals’, not in the financial sector. Its implication is that credit regulation and restraint 
can only restrain real-sector growth. Numerous empirical studies have indeed found that 
higher values of some measure for the aggregate credit stock (e.g. as % of GDP) are robustly 
associated with higher GDP growth rates (e.g. Beck et al, 2000; Leahey et al, 2001; Levine 
2005- but none of these make the distinction between credit to the real and to the financial 
sector). We here briefly review what deregulation meant in the context of the US. Again, this 
is illustrative for most of the world’s industrialized countries, and especially for the the Anglo 
Saxon economies. 
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From the early 1980s financial market deregulation (in the context of the freeing of the US 
Dollar from convertibility a decade earlier) allowed the banking system to step up dollar 
creation via bank lending. Banks’ lending appetite exceeded demand for liquidity from the 
real sector, which was constrained by the volatile and high interest rates of the period as 
policymakers used vigorous interest rate management in the battle against inflation. These 
high and volatile costs of capital were a drag on real-sector investment and consumption but 
stimulated lending and financial arbitrage. Additionally, US financial-market deregulation in 
the early 1980s inaugurated a rise in credit to financial markets generally and to mortgage 
markets specifically. ‘Regulation Q’, which capped the interest rates at which banks where 
allowed to loan funds, was phased out over some years in the early 1980s. Simultaneously in 
the non-bank financial sector, large institutional changes were opening up new investment 
opportunities, particularly in the household loans and mortgage market. The newly 
deregulated Savings & Loans market, for instance, absorbed unprecedented volumes of 
savings during the second half of the 1980s, directing them into mortgage credit. From the 
mid-1990s the technology stock bubble attracted large liquidity flows into what, in retrospect 
and despite appearances, were not real-sector but financial-sector investments, speculating on 
asset price increases. The dotcom bubble in stock markets also stimulated financial 
innovations which survived its puncturing, and which would facilitate the fast leveraging 
processes observed during subsequently maturing bubbles in derivatives, currency trade and 
housing. Predictably, allowing banks to provide credit flows to the FIRE sector strongly 
fuelled the growth of credit volumes and of indebtedness, as depicted in graphs 1 and 2. 
Deregulation was the institutional trend that facilitated it. 
 
The 1999 repeal of the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act was another milestone in financial-sector 
stimulation. Good overviews of its genesis and repeal are provided by Barth et al (2000), 
Hendrickson (2001) and Kuttner (2007), among others. This Banking Act of 1993, jointly 
with the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, restricted the ability of commercial banks to 
conduct the activities associated with securities firms, insurance companies, merchant banks, 
and other financial companies – all part of the FIRE sector. The moving forces behind the 
1993 Act were Senator Cater Glass and Henry Bascom Steagall, a House of Representatives 
member and chairman of the House Banking and Currency Committee. ‘Glass-Steagall’ was 
motivated by the over-leveraging practices that preceded the 1929 stock market crash. Among 
other things, it aimed to separate banking proper – that is taking in deposits and creating 
credit– from wealth investment and money management. Glass-Steagall regulation meant that 
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bank loans would stay on the books of the lender bank, which was responsible for loan 
collection or, alternatively, would have to shoulder default costs. 
 
Its 1999 repeal and replacement by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, in contrast, allowed banks 
to make out loans and then sell them, typically to a pension fund or other institutional investor. 
This freed banks from much of the loan risk. It also allowed banks to make profits more from 
fees collected when making out the loan than from safely collecting the loan. Both these 
changes – lower risk to the lending bank and profits from the number of loan transactions 
rather than from low risk-corrected returns - induced banks to increase lending volumes, 
especially to the FIRE sector, from the mid-1980s. Capital gains made in financial markets 
and on house prices compared well to real-sector profitability, rationalising continuous 
mortgage credit extension. Thus the repeal of “Glass Steagall” is a good illustration of how 
deregulation fuelled the growth in FIRE-sector lending to become self propelled, and to 
continue even after the initial conditions that had started it, had changed (Shiller, 2006). For 
instance, it stimulated the market for credit derivatives which sliced, sorted, repackaged, and 
insured loans in order to increase their tradability, to a point where “the level of equity in US 
homes [had become] the ultimate collateral support for the value of much of the world’s 
mortgage-backed securities” (Greenspan 2008). 
 
Many observe that the repeal of ‘Glass-Steagall’ had been preceded by a decade of inroads 
into it by financial innovations, and merely codified the status quo developed during the 
1990s (Kuttner 2007). Barth et al (2000:192) note three motivations for the repeal of Glass 
Steagall. Academic studies provided increasing evidence that banks’ securities activities bore 
little responsibility for the banking traumas of the Great Depression. Experimentation with 
limited FIRE sector activities had not shown any banking problems. And technological 
advances reduced the costs of information exchange and of the construction of new financial 
prodicts, so increasing the opportunity costs of maintaining Glass Steagall. Hendrickson 
(2001) supports especially the latter point, and shows how market and technological 
developments interacted with interest group pressure to bring about the repeal of Glass 
Steagall. She also, like this paper, presents this as an textbook example of the wider 
deregulation policies of the 1980s and 1990s. Until very recently, these were believed to 
“eliminates credit risks” as Das (2006:9) asserted in his recent overview of financial 
globalization: “Financial risks, particularly credit risks, are no longer borne by banks. They 
are increasingly moved off balance sheets. Assets are converted into tradable securities, which 
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in turn eliminates credit risks. Derivative transactions like interest rate swaps also serve the 
same purpose. Risk elimination enables banks to improve their risk-adjusted returns on capital 
as well as be more competitive in the market.” 
 
Government regulation was to be replaced by self-regulation, where the self-interest of 
lending institutions would lead them to protect shareholder’s equity, by reigning in risks and 
thereby safeguarding systemic stability. Greenspan (2008) in his October 2008 testimony 
before the Committee of Government Oversight and Reform described such “counterparty 
surveillance” supported by the “modern risk management paradigm that held sway for 
decades” as “a central pillar of our financial markets’ state of balance”, – but also professed to 
“shocked disbelief” while watching that “whole intellectual edifice collapse in the summer of 
[2007]”. 
 
6.3 Monetary Policy Neglect of Asset Prices 
 
So far this section has shown that System of National Accounts accounting rules have defined 
away asset price effects from the most widely observed economic indicators, while bank 
deregulation has both fuelled asset price growth and rand hindered their monitoring as FIRE-
sector trading went off banks balance sheets. With hindsight, it is clear that this increased the 
vulnerability of the economy and of bank performance to asset price declines. A possible 
antidote might have been for analysts and policymakers to closely monitor asset price 
developments and adjust their analyses and policies accordingly.  Asset price inflation would 
then be taken into account alongside conventional measures such as GDP and consumer price 
inflation. 
 
Oddly, during the past asset price boom Central Bank economists and policy makers have 
moved precisely in the opposite direction. They have increasingly neglected or ignored asset 
markets. That neglect was not accidental but intentional, and supported by theoretical 
reasoning by central bankers and their (often high powered) research departments, as we show 
below. The problem here is not one of introducing inappropriate accounting and monitoring 
rules (as can be argued for some deregulation policies), but rather of not using some of the 
information that was available (namely, on asset price trends) in formulating monetary 
policies. This neglect is arguable one of the key reasons why the 2007-8 credit crisis took 
 26 
most policy makers by surprise, leading to “shocked disbelief”. They did not think an asset 
price crisis would matter that much. Why not? 
 
An important reason is to be found in the academic debate during the 1990s and 2000s  –  a 
debate dominated by central bank researchers – on the role of asset prices in monetary policy. 
In the face of the global asset price boom, and of demands that central banks and financial 
authorities should take its effects into account when assessing the impact of monetary policy 
and of financial system stability, the case was made that policymakers should not let asset 
prices detract attention from inflation (not asset prices) as the only appropriate target and 
interest rates (not credit aggregates) as the only appropriate instruments of monetary policy. 
Asset booms or even bubbles were not to be pricked by central bank action. Again, Bernanke 
(e.g. 2002) and Gertler (e.g. 1998) have been prominently advancing this view, in addition to 
Greenspan (e.g. 1999). The principal objections are the difficulties associated with identifying 
an asset bubble (risking policy moves that are premature and therefore costly rather than 
beneficial to the economy) and the high costs to the real economy of bursting an asset bubble 
via interest rate increases (the only instrument allowed in orthodox monetary policy). 
Bernanke (2002) enunciated this view well when he wrote that “my suspicion is that bubbles 
can normally be arrested only by an increase in the interest rate sharp enough to materially 
slow the whole economy. in short, we cannot produce ‘safe popping’”. And Greenspan (1999) 
preferred to  “mitigate the fallout when it occurs and, hopefully, ease the transition to the next 
expansion”. In consequence of this reticence of bursting bubbles, and combined with the 
generous credit facilities that allowed bubbles to develop since the mid-1980s, some critics 
have portrayed the Federal Reserve as ‘serial bubble blower’, as Wadhani (2009:29) notes. 
 
In contrast, Wadhwani himself (2009) argues for a mild adaptation of inflation-targeting 
policies by at least taking asset price effects into account (but not make them policy targets) in 
conducting interest rate policies. He mentions the higher output volatility during an asset price 
bubble, and the duration and costs of busts, which are 4 per cent of GDP for equity busts in 
OECD countries (which last 2.5 years on average), and twice as much for housing busts 
which also last twice as long) Wadhwani (2009: 25). Roubini (2006) goes further and asserts 
simply that Central Bank should burst bubbles, suggesting ways that authorities could contain 
the damage of a pricked bubble. But these and other analysts were decidedly outside the 
consensus view that asset prices were not part of the fundamentals that policy makers should 
be concerned with. 
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7. Summary and Conclusion 
 
This paper has, admittedly, been wide-ranging. In conclusion, it is helpful to recapitulate its 
main arguments and evidence before reflecting on its merits and shortcomings, and suggest 
some fruitful avenues for future research. 
 
The unifying theme of the paper is to reflect on the role of accounting principles and rules in 
our monetary system. It uses the metaphor of banks as ‘social accountants’ as a tool to explain 
the credit nature of money, but also to replace the conventional ‘quantity theory of money’ 
with a ‘quality theory of credit’. In particular, it makes the following points. Money is only 
one category of credit, and other categories matter as well. The impact of the financial sector 
and of financial and monetary polices on the real economy is not fully reflected in the money 
supply, interest rates and consumer price inflation; but rather in the total credit supply 
(including money) and in prices of both goods and services and of assets. It is important to 
realize that money is bank credit and thus an accounting concept, and therefore that 
accounting rules and regulations in the banking sector matter to an economy’s performance. 
Bank credit creation implies debt creation, and regulators’ task is to create an environment in 
which credit is targeted so as to be welfare-enhancing and in which debts are kept within 
sustainable levels. It is therefore equally important to realize that not all credit is money and 
that modern economies are dual economies. The real sector is always accompanied by a 
financial sector, which allows for risk diversification and smoothing of consumption and 
investment; but which also generates debt at a rate which is not necessarily in line with the 
real economy’s ability to pay off debt. If banks and regulator are not sufficiently mindful of 
these points too large a debt overhead may develop, which may precipitate a credit crisis. 
 
These points were made in a historical review of the archeology of money, which showed that 
money originated as credit. With asset markets, this implies the possibility of debt growth out 
of proportion to economic growth. The paper then proceeded by illustrating such a trend the 
uses of bank credit, and the consequences for debt growth, for the case of the US over the last 
half century. It showed that total US debt growth is equal to US FIRE sector debts growth, 
and that these have quintupled over the last halve century, especially accelerating since the 
early 1980s with the advent of financial deregulation. It discussed the role of banks and of 
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regulators in facilitating this credit boom, and identified three trends in society’s accounting 
rules that have each played a role in the long asset boom of the 1980s, 1990s and most of the 
2000s. First, wealth and debt growth, though they have increasingly influenced income 
developments in industrialized countries over the last decades, are not included in 
conventional income definition used in the System of National Accounts. This hindered their 
identification and monitoring. Second, financial deregulation amounted to changing society’s 
accounting rules so as to facilitate the credit boom and debt buildup. Third, asset prices were 
theoretically believed to be outside the proper domain of what monetary policy makers should 
take into account when formulating their policies. The judicious pricking of asset bubbles was 
officially deemed impossible by those in a position to do so. This precluded pre-emptive 
action. 
 
The accounting approach to monetary matters presented in this paper would seem to imply a 
number of policy implications, including a greater role for credit flows and asset prices in 
monetary analysis policy, and reconsideration of financial deregulation. Developing these 
broad principles into detailed policy proposals and judging their costs and benefits relative to 
conventional practice  is beyond the scope of this paper, and in any case has been taken up by 
several other researchers (e.g. Borio and Lowe, 2004; Geanakoplos 2009). Instead, we 
conclude  by briefly indicating avenues for further research. 
 
A first area to incorporate the inherently dual nature of modern capitalist economies. 
Spefically, as with mnay vital distinction, the dividing line between the real and the financial 
sector is in reality a grey area. Recognizing the importance of debt buildup to the 
sustainability of growth implies that the different uses of credit should receive closer 
monitoring… (to be continued) 
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